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BOOK REVIEWS
belligerent the benefits of due process, and requires that the civilian courts
strictly confine the jurisdiction of the military to what will withstand critical
scrutiny.
Mr. Reel is notably successful in combining the dramatic aspects of his
story with the technicalities of the law, which enhances the value of the book
for educating the public to that little known area of law in which civilian
and military jurisdictions impinge on each other. Moreover, this account
of Yamashita's case is a new reminder of the very human and violently
emotional situations which have given rise to the safeguards which normally
hedge in our criminal procedure. The reader is persuaded that Yamashita
paid for crimes for which he was not personally responsible and which, if
circumstances had permitted, he might have tried to suppress. The book does
not help to explain what seems to be a consistent pattern of gratuitous cruelty
indulged in by Japanese forces against civilians and prisoners of war. Neither
the prosecution nor the defense in Yamashita's case throws light on this
interesting question, which, perhaps, can be answered only through a close
acquaintance with Japanese culture and history. The answer to this problem
is not likely to be one of a nature which permits the fixing of responsibility
for Japanese war crimes in accordance with the recognized categories of
the law.
The reviewer is greatly impressed with the conscientious, skillful, and
energetic defense which Yamashita's counsel afforded to a fallen foe. These
lawyers, who were chosen quite at random, overcame tremendous obstacles
at almost every step, eventually carrying their case to the Supreme Court
and then on to the White House. As a layman, the reviewer can say in
good grace that this remarkable record is not without significance as an
index to the health of the American legal profession.
EDWARD H. BUEIIRIGt
PUBLIC ORGANIZATION OF ELECTRIC POWER, by John Bauer and Peter
Costello. New York: Harper & Brothers. Pp. 263.

Public Organization of Electric Power, by John Bauer and his associate,
Peter Costello, presents the most effective analysis of the case for public
ownership and operation of the electric power industry that has appeared.
Dr. Bauer has devoted most of his life to the cause of effective regulation
and he concludes with reluctance that regulation can never accomplish the national organization of the industry, the reduction in costs, and the universal
availability of this basic and essential service which the public requires. "I
should prefer continuance of private ownership under public control if this
t Professor of Government, Indiana University.
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could be made really effective. In principle, it could be; in reality, it won't
be." The public organization of the industry is, therefore, advanced as the
only means to correct the distortions of the private power systems, the incompetences of regulation, and the conflicts between public and private interests
inherent in the continuance of private ownership under public regulation.
The argument is presented in terms of an appraisal of the organization
and conduct of the industry, an analysis of costs and rates, and a consideration
of the defects of regulation. The alternative proposed is a rationalized series
of federal, state and local systems. The federal system or systems would
generate the base or main load demands at large, strategically located hydroelectric and steam stations, and deliver power over high voltage transmission
systems. The states would provide generating capacity to supplement the
main loads delivered by the federal system, operate secondary transmission
lines, and perhaps perform distribution functions where no local operator
exists. The operation of the local distribution facilities would be in the
hands of municipalities or local power districts.
A consideration of the organization and conduct of the industry begins
with the basic difficulty that managements are ineradicably oriented toward
private corporate advantage and that they cannot be induced to give primacy
to the public interest. The monopoly character of the industry is credited
with destroying compctitive pressures for technological progress, reductions
in cost, and a full development of the potential market. While continuing to
operate obsolete plants, private electric systems have been able to absorb as
profits economies arising from internal economies effected by management,
from technical progress outside the utility systems (e.g., from improvements
in equipment), and from the expansion in volume resulting from growth in
public demand for service. The power industry is found to fall substantially
short of satisfying standards of engineering efficiency; with notable exceptions, there is no regional pooling of generating facilities to make maximum
use of large, modern plants; interconnections provide no over-all planned
grid of transmission facilities; and the market is divided into many uneconomic service areas.
Organizational defects account for only a part of the allegedly high
costs that restrict the market for electric service. An analysis of the electric
plant accounts for Class A and B companies serving cities of 50,000 revealed
average gross book costs of $456 per customer; this book cost, measured
against an assumed prudent investment of $250 per customer based on the
Federal Power Commission's original cost determinations for 43 companies
as of 1945, with depreciation assumed to be 30 per cent, is judged to be
excessive by 80 per cent. The excessive book cost figures are matched by a
"general condition of prevalent overcapitalization"-the result of "past piece-
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meal construction," of the "continuance of old, obsolete and even discarded
units in the property accounts," and of "write-ups during successive stages of
consolidations." This is cited "as a fixed barrier against future rate reductions in accordance with low costs basically available." An analysis of the
steam generating capacity of large companies (each with a gross electric plant
investment of $5,000,000 or over) in a leading industrial state of the Northeast revealed less than 20 per cent of the units having an efficiency in 1942
suitable for main-load operation; average coal consumption was 1.33 pounds
per kilowatt hour, whereas only plants requiring 0.8 pound were considered
economical for regular operation (the realizable standard of modern large
plant efficiency then being 0.7 pound), units requiring 0.9 pound to 1.0
pound being economical for off-peak loads, units using 1.0 to 1.2 pounds
being suitable only for stand-by purposes, with coal at $5 per ton.
Another source of high costs is attributed to elaborate and extravagant
management structures. In 1942, 123 large-city companies incurred an average of $10.58 per customer for three overheads-customer accounting and
collecting, sales promotion, and administrative and general expenses; a reasonable figure was judged to be $6.50.
A third major source of dissatisfaction with the private power industry
centers in the incompetence of public regulation. The Federal Power Commission is credited with having done more than any other public body in
bringing about rate reductions; its reclassification of plant accounts to show
the original cost of electric properties has given state commissions the means
of regulating rates more effectively; also it has "developed simplified
standards and procedures, adopted definitely the prudent investment (original
cost less depreciation) as rate base, and obtained confirmation from the
Supreme Court in the . . . Hope Natural Gas Company case"; its publica-

tion of comparative electric bills has directed public attention to high-rate
communities. The Securities and Exchange Commission is credited with
reasonable success in the dissolution of holding company systems, pressing for
sounder capitalizations and proper reserves, and eliminating intrasystem
profits; however, it has lacked authority to accomplish an affirmative reconstitution of properties to assure maximum efficiency in organization and operation, and in approving divestments of stocks at prices reflecting existing earning power, the "prior overcapitalization of the operating companies" has been
"frozen in" to their capital structures. But for the rest, regulation "has not
furnished protection to consumers as intended, has retarded efficiency as
available through advancing technology, and has not even prevented losses
to investors."
In presenting the affirmative opportunities for the public organization of
power, the authors continue their practice of making their assumptions ex-
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plicit and of introducing figures to support their arguments. The outstanding advantage of public organization is found in ending the conflict
between public-interested objectives and private interests. An equally fundamental long-term gain would be the more efficient organization and integration of the functions of generation, transmission and distribution. Other
advantages in substituting public for private operation includes escaping from
the prevalent over-capitalization of electric properties, obtaining the savings
from low interest rates, eliminating the excessive overhead expenses of private
companies, saving on the payments of federal taxes, eliminating the discriminations inherent in prevailing rate schedules, and realizing the public advantages of more extensive use of power resulting from low, objective rates.
The authors have marshalled their facts, developed dollar-and-cents
figures, and placed on dissenters the burden of demonstrating that the electric
power industry will serve the public interest more effectively under private
than public organization. The case that has been made for public organization
cannot be met by an affirmation of faith in private enterprise or of distrust
in public management. No evidence is at hand to demonstrate that private
managements of public utilities have, on the average, any higher sense of
public responsibility and public trust than have the managements of other
corporations that are not subject to regulation. Also a half century and more
of experience has not only failed to develop satisfactory techniques for the
regulation of utility enterprises, it has not even produced a consistent pattern
of independent and competent performance of their public responsibilities by
the regulatory authorities. Indeed, when disinterested students of regulatory
processes consider the records of public service commissions and their staffs,
there is ready agreement on the instances of competent, progressive and courageous regulation and the honor role is distressingly brief.
In the past the campaign against public ownership, where reliance has
not been upon name-calling, has rested on general assertions of the superior
efficiency of private management and the alleged incompetence of public
management. The argument no longer carries conviction; the conspicuous
success of many public systems is well known, their comparative costs and
rates have been tested by many disinterested authorities. Nor do public
service commissions continue to function as a protective screen against criticism when consumers see that regulated companies' rates are no lower than
the rates of unregulated utilities and when experience demonstrates that
public competition is more successful than regulation in inducing private companies to lower rates, expand service, and still earn a fair return. However,
if it be acknowledged that public competition has had a salutary effect on
private utilities, it must also be recognized that private companies' political
pressures on public undertakings have doubtless favored alert, progressive and

BOOK REVIEWS
efficient performance by public managements. If the situation were reversed
and the industry became as predominantly public as it is now private, public
managements might tend to become less competent; in the absence of competitive yardsticks, it is not easy to get beyond political criticisms in appraising
the performance of government operations. The authors acknowledge that
public regulation of private utilities could theoretically obtain for consumers
many of the advantages which they seek through public organization of
electric power, but they have little confidence, in the present temper of the
industry and of regulatory agencies, that there will be any real renaissance
in regulation-a state of mind which objective observers of regulation will
understand and in a measure share. Yet if public ownership becomes a more
potent factor in electric power, the private sector of the industry has this
defense: If the private companies had the wisdom to use their influence to
assure truly competent, effective and independent (independent of the
regulated utility companies) regulation, there could be a restoration of public
confidence in regulatory agencies and regulated enterprises. However, it is
unlikely that this measure of wisdom will be forthcoming until the field is lost.
Many of the economic advantages of public organization can be obtained
short of complete public ownership and operation. A national grid system
would permit a more rational organization of the industry, concentrating
production in modern efficient generating plants, developing cost standards
for the separate functions of generation, transmission and distribution, permitting specific performances to determine the choice between public and
private operation in the particular instance and guaranteeing efficiency in
each branch of the industry. Substantially this recommendation was advanced
in the Twentieth Century Fund report on the electric power industry, with the
concurrence of the utility executives on the advisory committee, as a means of
reorganizing the industry to promote efficiency in service and effectiveness in
regulation.
IRSTON R. BARNESt
REvrNUE AcT OF 1948. Legislative History Series. Edited by Paul A.
Wolkin and Marcus Manoff. Albany, N. Y.: Matthew Bender and Company.
Pp. xxiii, 667.

The popular phrases around which the supporters of the Revenue Act of
1948 rallied to pass the bill through Congress and then to pass the bill over the
veto of the President of the United States were "geographical tax equalization" and "tax reduction." For many years there had been an unequal
federal tax burden upon married residents of the United States, depending
"tBureau of Industrial Economics, Federal Trade Commission.

